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Why PE Misleads For Cyclicals Such As Cement, Steel And Metals

1 hour ago
7 min read

PE divides the share price by earnings per share. Used on a software company, a consumer brand, or a private bank, it works reasonably well, because last year’s earnings are a fair guide to next year’s. A stable earnings stream lets the ratio act as a shorthand for how many years of profit the market is paying for.


That shorthand depends on an assumption: that the earnings in the denominator are close to the company’s normal, sustainable earning power. For cyclical businesses, such as steel, aluminium, zinc, copper, and to a lesser extent cement, this assumption fails. Their earnings are not a level. They are a point on a wave, and the PE ratio only tells you where on the wave the company happens to be standing today.


The Cyclical Paradox: PE Is Lowest At The Peak And Highest At The Trough

Markets do not price a cyclical company on current earnings. They price it on expectations of where earnings are heading. At the top of a cycle, investors know that record profits will not last, so they refuse to pay a normal multiple for them, and the PE looks low.


At the bottom, investors expect recovery, so they hold the price up even as profits collapse, and the PE looks high, or becomes meaningless when the company reports a loss.

The table below uses hypothetical numbers to show the pattern. Notice how little the share price moves compared with earnings.

Phase of the cycle

Earnings per share

Share price

PE shown on screen

Peak earnings

Rs 40

Rs 160

4.0x

Earnings falling

Rs 15

Rs 105

7.0x

Trough earnings

Rs 2

Rs 90

45.0x

Recovery

Rs 12

Rs 150

12.5x

 

Hypothetical figures for illustration only. An investor who screened for a low PE would have bought at Rs 160 when the ratio read 4.0x and watched the price fall by more than 40% to Rs 90. An investor who rejected the stock for its 45.0x PE would have walked away at Rs 90, just before a rise of about two thirds. The ratio was a reliable signal, pointing in the wrong direction.


For a cyclical, a cheap PE is often the market saying that the profits will not last. An expensive PE is often the market saying that they will return.


A Real Example: Tata Steel’s Profit Path

Tata Steel’s reported consolidated results over the past five years show how violent the swings can be for a large, well run steel producer.

Financial year

Consolidated net profit

What was happening

FY22

Rs 40,154 crore

A record year. In Q2 FY22 the company’s quarterly profit exceeded that of TCS.

FY23

Rs 8,760 crore

Down about 78%. Q2 EBITDA per tonne fell from Rs 24,112 to Rs 8,045 in a year.

FY24

Loss of about Rs 4,910 crore

A reported net loss, as profits fell below the cost of a heavy debt and fixed cost base.

FY25

Rs 3,174 crore

Highest ever crude steel production and deliveries, at roughly 31 million tonnes.

FY26

About Rs 10,800 crore

A recovery, according to a financial data aggregator’s reading of the annual accounts.

 

Two features of this table matter. First, the profit fell from over Rs 40,000 crore to a loss within two years. A PE calculated on FY22 earnings would have looked remarkably low, and a PE calculated on FY24 would have been undefined.


Neither describes what the business was truly capable of earning across a full cycle. Second, FY25 delivered record volumes and still produced a fraction of FY22’s profit. Volume was not the driver. The spread between steel prices and the cost of coking coal, iron ore, and energy was, and that spread belongs to global markets rather than to the company.


Reported profit also reflects exceptional items and the performance of the European business, so these figures are best read as an indication of scale rather than a clean operating series.

Why Earnings Swing So Violently

Driver

How it amplifies the swing

Price taking

Steel, aluminium, zinc, and copper prices are set largely in global markets. The producer cannot raise its own price when costs rise or demand weakens.

Operating leverage

Plants carry large fixed costs. When prices rise, almost all of the increase drops to profit. When they fall, the same fixed costs remain.

Financial leverage

Interest on debt does not fall in a downturn. Tata Steel’s consolidated net debt stood at Rs 82,579 crore at the end of FY25, so interest absorbs a larger share of a shrinking operating profit.

Capacity cycles

High prices encourage new capacity. When that capacity arrives, usually after demand has already softened, it pushes prices and utilisation down together.

Input cost swings

Coking coal, iron ore, power, and fuel move independently of selling prices, so margins can compress even when the product price is stable.

 

Cement sits at the milder end of this spectrum because it is sold regionally, and the product is heavy and expensive to move. But it is still a spread business with high fixed costs. UltraTech’s EBITDA per tonne ran at roughly Rs 900 to Rs 1,250 across recent quarters, against realisations of around Rs 4,900 to Rs 5,800 per tonne.


At that level, a change of Rs 5 per 50 kg bag, which is Rs 100 per tonne, moves EBITDA per tonne by about a tenth before any change in costs. Depreciation and interest are fixed, so profit after tax moves by considerably more. Narrower swings than steel are still swings.


What Analysts Use Instead

Brokerage research on cement and metals companies rarely leans on PE at all. A recent set of reports on UltraTech illustrates the point. They value the company on EV to EBITDA, with target multiples in the range of 17x to 19x, quote enterprise value per tonne of installed capacity at roughly US$ 200 in a July 2026 note, and in one case anchor the valuation on enterprise value to capital employed. PE appears, if at all, as a cross check.

Measure

What it corrects for

Where it works best

Normalised or mid cycle PE

Replaces one year’s earnings with an average across a full cycle, commonly seven to ten years.

Any cyclical with a long, stable earnings history.

EV to EBITDA

Removes the effect of debt, interest, and depreciation policy, which distort PE in capital heavy businesses.

Comparing steel, cement, and metals producers with different balance sheets.

EV per tonne of capacity

Compares what the market pays per unit of installed capacity with what building it would cost.

Cement and steel, where capacity is the core asset.

EBITDA per tonne

Shows unit economics directly, free of changes in volume.

Tracking whether a profit move came from spreads or from scale.

Price to book, or EV to capital employed, with return on equity

Anchors value to the asset base rather than to the earnings of a single year.

Metals and mining, where assets and replacement cost matter most.

 

Normalising earnings is the simplest correction, and the direction of its signal is more sensible. Using the hypothetical company from earlier, the average earnings per share across the four phases is Rs 17.25. Dividing each price by that average gives a very different picture.

Phase of the cycle

Share price

PE on that year’s earnings

PE on cycle average earnings

Peak earnings

Rs 160

4.0x

9.3x

Earnings falling

Rs 105

7.0x

6.1x

Trough earnings

Rs 90

45.0x

5.2x

Recovery

Rs 150

12.5x

8.7x

 

On the normalised measure, the stock is most expensive at the peak and cheapest at the trough, which is the order a sensible valuation should follow. The ordinary PE had it exactly reversed. The cycle average is itself a judgement, since it depends on the period chosen and on whether the business has structurally changed, so it should be treated as a better compass rather than as a precise answer.


Questions That Matter More Than The Multiple

• Where are spreads relative to their own history? The gap between the selling price and the key input costs is the real driver. Record spreads argue for caution. Compressed spreads argue for a closer look.


• What capacity is coming? Announced expansions across the industry tell you where supply and pricing are heading, often more reliably than current demand.


• How much debt does the company carry? Leverage decides who survives a downturn and who is forced to raise capital at the worst moment.


• Where does the company sit on the cost curve? Low cost producers stay profitable when prices fall. High cost producers are the first to lose money, and the first to close.


•Is an exceptional item flattering or hiding the result? Asset sales, impairments, and tax adjustments can make a single year’s earnings, and therefore its PE, nearly meaningless.


Where PE Still Helps

None of this makes PE useless. It remains a reasonable quick check for businesses within these sectors that enjoy more stable earnings, such as the largest cement producers in a steady demand environment, and it is a perfectly good tool once earnings have been normalised.


The error lies in reading an unadjusted PE for a cyclical as though it carried the same meaning as for a consumer company. The same number, on the same screen, means something almost opposite.


Note: The price to earnings ratio is the first number most investors check, and for cyclical companies it is frequently the most misleading one. A low PE can mark the point of greatest risk, and a very high PE can mark the point of greatest opportunity. This article explains why the signal inverts, uses Tata Steel’s reported profit history and recent brokerage research on UltraTech to show it in real numbers, and sets out the measures that serve better. It is not a recommendation on any company, and the hypothetical tables are labelled as such.


Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Companies named here are used only to illustrate valuation concepts and are not recommendations. Profit figures for Tata Steel are drawn from company results as reported in the press and from a financial data aggregator, and may differ by definition, such as reported against attributable profit, or after exceptional items. UltraTech multiples and capacity valuations are drawn from brokerage research published in 2025 and 2026 and change with price and estimates. The tables of earnings, prices, and PE ratios for the hypothetical company are illustrative and do not describe any listed company. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Consult a qualified financial adviser before making any investment decision.

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